In surveys individuals are routinely asked to predict their future behavior, that is, to state their intentions. The use of intentions data to predict behavior has been controversial. This paper determines the information content of intentions under the vvbest-casevv assumption that individuals respond as would persons with rational expectations. It is found that intentions data bound but do not identify the probability that a person will behave in a given way. Some mixed empirical evidence on consistency with the bounds is presented. Two alternatives to traditional intentions questions are considered. These are "probability forecastsvv and wforced-choicen questions.
2 Social scientists seeking to predict behavior differ in the use they make of such questions. Economists, observing the high frequency of discrepancy between stated intentions and subsequent behavior, generally ignore the responses. Their practice has been to use data on past behavior, filtered through econometric models of decision making, to predict future behavior. See, for example, the predictions of schooling-work behavior in Manski and Wise (1983, Chap. 7) .
Demographers often use intentions data to predict behavior. Westoff and Ryder (1977) .
Neither of these practices is well grounded. It is reasonable for economists to ignore stated intentions only if these data contain no information about future behavior. The fact that intentions and behavior often diverge does not, however, imply that the former are uninformative about the latter. At the same time, the demographic literature offers no compelling reason to think that path models appropriately express the relationship between intentions and behavior.
To use intentions data fruitfully, we need to understand how individuals respond to the survey questions asked of them. This paper explores the implications of the economic hypothesis that individuals respond as would persons with rational expectations.
3
The rational-expectations hypothesis is interesting not because it is necessarily realistic but because it places an upper bound on the behavioral information contained in intentions data.
Under rational expectations, stated intentions are best point predictors of subsequent behavior. Thus this paper studies a Itbest-casew scenario for the use of intentions data to predict behavior.
The paper examines intentions questions that concern binary choices, as do the fertility and schooling-work questions cited earlier. Intentions data about binary choices are easier to interpret than are responses to quantitative questions. (For example, the CPS fertility supplement asks "How many more do you expect to have?Iv) So again the focus is on a best-case scenario.
Even within the restricted world of rational expectations and behavior based on binary choices, the interpretation of intentions data requires care. The rational-expectations hypothesis does not imply that intentions and behavior always coincide. The two may diverge whenever the information available to the respondent at the time of the survey is more limited than the information he or she will possess at the later time when behavior is determined.
The discrepancies between intentions and behavior can be large. Suppose, for example, that all of the NLS72 respondents say that they expect to be working in October 1974. Suppose that only 50 percent subsequently do so. We shall show that this pattern of responses is consistent with rational expectations.
4
It does not imply that respondents wrongly predict their future behavior.
On the other hand, the discrepancies between intentions and behavior cannot be arbitrarily large. consider again the NLS72 questions. If respondents have rational expectations and if an auxiliary condition holds, the fraction who do work must be within 1/2 of the fraction who say they intend to do so. Thus intentions data do contain some information about behavior.
The foregoing findings are developed in Section 2, which shows that intentions data bound but do not identify the probability that a person will behave in a given way. Section 3 applies these bounds to the problem of testing the rationalexpectations hypothesis and presents some mixed empirical evidence. Section 4 considers "probability forecastsgg as an alternative to the traditional survey question on intentions.
Section 5 discusses mforced-choicetg questions, which are distinct from but sometimes confused with intentions questions. Section 6 offers conclusions.
Although the substantive concern of this paper is the use of intentions data, most of the analysis applies to a larger class of prediction questions asked in surveys. Individuals are often asked to make a point prediction of some future binary event, not necessarily their own future behavior. For example, economists are often asked to predict whether the unemployment rate will rise or fall. All of the analysis in Sections 2 through 4 applies 5 to such questions. Only the discussion of Section 5 is specific to questions regarding the respondent's own behavior. Suppose that the researcher wishes to predict the behavior y conditional on the observed variables x and i. Then he would like to learn the probability P(y=llx,i). Intentions data do not identify P(y=llx,i). They do, however, imply a bound.
Let P,lxi denote the probability distribution of s conditional on the observed pair (x,i). In general, The foregoing implies that some familiar models for p(yIx,i)
are not consistent with the rational-expectations hypothesis.
Consider first the binary logit model where (ply) are parameters. This model has the property Condition (6) is consistent with (4) only if (x,p,y) satisfies the special property xp I 0 I xp + y.
This problem is, of course, not limited to the logit model.
It is a characteristic of any model which attempts to explain y as a function of a linear index xp+ri.
prediction Not conditional on Intentions
Often a researcher wants to predict the behavior of a nonsampled member of the population from which the survey respondents were drawn. Intentions data are available only for the sampled individuals. But some background variables x may be 9 observed for the entire population. In this setting, one may want to predict behavior conditional on these x. Then the quantity of interest is ~(y=ll x) .
The bound (4) implies a bound on P(y=llx).
Observe that
It follows from (4) and (7) that This bound, unlike (4), does vary with x.
The bound (8) The rational-expectations hypothesis implies that (9) should hold in one very special case; that in which future behavior depends only on the information s available at the time of the survey. In this case, the respondent can forecast his future behavior with certainty. So i always equals y.
In the nondegenerate case when future events z partially determine behavior, the rational-expectations hypothesis does not imply (9 provided only that the event p(y=lls) = 1/2 occurs with probability zero conditional on x. On the other hand,
The right-hand sides of (10) and (11) are not generally equal.
A simple example makes the point forcefully. Suppose that ~(y=lls) = .51 for all values of s. Then P(y=llx) = .51 but P(i=l(x) = 1.
CONSISTENT BOUNDS TESTS OF THE RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS

The No-Aqqreqate-Shocks Condition
In introducing the rational-expectations hypothesis, we emphasized its "best-casen property; it makes intentions a best predictor of behavior. One may also wish to know whether the rational-expectations hypothesis describes the way people really respond to intentions questions. The bounds (4) and (8) suggest simple tests of this hypothesis.
Suppose that one observes x and i on an initial survey of a random sample of the relevant population and observes y on a later resurvey. Assume, for simplicity, that x is discrete.
Then P (i=ll x) , P(y=ll x) , and P (y=l lx, i) can be estimated by the corresponding sample frequencies, and one may check whether the estimates satisfy the bounds.
These bounds tests are consistent provided that the estimates for P (i=l (x) , P (y=ll x) , and P (y=ll x, i) are consistent. Random sampling ensures that the estimate for P(i=llx) is consistent.
The estimates for P(y=l(x) and P(y=llx,i) are consistent as long as the realizations of the future events z are not too dependent across the population. This auxiliary condition is sometimes referred to as the absence of #'aggregate shocks."
To see the problem that dependence can cause, consider the extreme case in which a single event z is drawn from the distribution P,ls, and all the people characterized by s realize this event. Then ~(y=lls) continues to be given by equation (1) but, conditioning on s t the realized frequency of the event y = 1 can be only zero or one, depending on what single realization of z is drawn.
Em~irical Evidence from the NLS72
The NLS72 offers an opportunity to perform the tests. The intentions questions quoted at the beginning of Section 1 were followed by behavior questions asked in the fall of 1974: These questions about behavior correspond closely, although not perfectly, to the intentions questions asked a year earlier.
One difference is that a "temporary lay-offtt question was added to the 1974 survey. A second is that the instructions call for respondents to ttcircle as many as applyw rather than to "circle one number on each line.I1 A third difference is that the respondents to the intentions questions were asked to forecast their behavior in October 1974, whereas the behavior questions concern the first week of that month. These distinctions will be ignored here, although it is possible that they are germane. Table 1 presents findings for the case in which x gives the respondentts sex. The probabilities P(i=llx), P(y=l(x), and ~(y=llx,i) are estimated by corresponding sample frequencies.
For example the estimate of P(work=l~x=male,i=O) is based on the 2546 males who said they did not expect to work; the fraction of this group who reported working a year later was .42. It is possible, but unlikely, that these findings reflect sampling variation. The estimates for P(i=l(x) and P(y=llx) are based on samples of roughly 10,000 observations. Those for ~(y=l\x,i) are based on samples whose minimum size is 158 and which generally have several thousand observations.
The estimates for P(i=llx) are from random samples and therefore are extremely precise. The estimates for ~(y=llx) and P(y=lJx,i) must also be precise unless the realizations of z are strongly dependent across the population of NLS72 respondents. Em~irical Evidence from the National Fertilitv Survey
The National Fertility Survey of 1970 offers an additional opportunity to test the rational-expectations hypothesis.
Westoff and Ryder (1977) 
PROBABILITY FORECASTS
Survey researchers using the traditional intentions question ask the respondent to make a point prediction of his future behavior. One could instead ask for a probability forecast.
Under the rational-expectations hypothesis, this amounts to asking the respondent for the value of P(y=lls).
Probability forecasts are much more informative about behavior than are point forecasts. Intentions data reveal only the bounds (4) and (8) on P(y(x,i) and ~(ylx) respectively.
Probability forecasts identify P(y(x,i) and P(y(x) themselves.
To see this, observe that If x is discrete, the right-hand-side expression in (12a) can be estimated by the sample average of the probability forecasts P(y=lIs) among the subsample of respondents who are characterized by x and who report ~(y=lls) s 1/2. The right hand sides of (12b) and (12c) can be estimated by analogous sample averages. If x is continuous, nonparametric regression methods can be applied.
Survey researchers very rarely ask for probability forecasts.
The prevailing view among them seems to be that people are able The difference between (15) and (16) On the other hand, it is premature to reach any conclusion on the descriptive validity of the rational-expectations hypothesis.
The limited evidence given in Section 3 was mixed. In presenting that evidence I intentionally did not try to explain the several observed violations of the bounds. To understand how people actually respond to survey questions requires serious research, not ex-post rationalizations of particular response patterns.
